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DEODAND
A LEGAL ANTIQUITY THAT MAY STILL EXIST
EDMUND WEBSTBR BURKE*

T HE common law is composed, to a large extent, of

ancient doctrines and principles. The lawyer who
interests himself in the history and growth of those principles acquires a knowledge of subjects sometimes important to the practice as it now exists, but always extremely fascinating. Buried among the reports, yearbooks, and the Writings of our earliest authors, are doctrines and theories difficult of comprehension today, yet
lawsuits were decided upon them, and our forerunners
in the legal profession practised them. No matter how
remote they may be, it is unusual to find a single one of
these forgotten doctrines or principles that have not had
some place, and often a great one, in the growth of the
law, and that has not left its imprint upon either the
adjective or substantive law as we find it at the present
time. If there is such a thing as culture, there is culture
in a profession, and it is the contention of the author of
this brief survey of one of these ancient theories, that
no practitioner is wasting his energy or time, no matter
how great his professional duties, in familiarizing himself with the old legal customs, and in general with the
growth and development of the law.
Deodand means "a thing forfeited to God." And the
action arising therefrom is one of our earliest proceedings in rem. It is defined in Corpus Juris (18 C. J.,
489), as "any personal chattel whatever, animate or inanimate, which, becoming the immediate instrument by
which the death of a human creature was caused, was forfeited to the king for sale, and a distribution of the proceeds in alms to the poor by his high almoner, for the
appeasing of God's wrath." From the third Inst., 57,
we have the following: "and therefore every beast or
* Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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thing .movable inanimate which occasions the death of a
man within the body of a county without the default of
himself or another, shall be forfeited to the king as a
deodand to be employed in eleemosynam."
Where the doctrine originated is impossible to determine. That it existed in England long before the
Norman Conquest, we are sure. We have indications of
the theory outside of England-from the Law of Moses
we find, "if an ox gore a man that he die, the ox shall be
stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." The beast having caused the death of the human, was damned. From
the Law of the ancient Athenians we find this same attitude towards the instrumentality causing the death, for
"whatever was the cause of a man's death by falling
upon him, was exterminated or cast out of the dominion
of the republic." (.Eschin. Cont. Cteriph) (Stephen Com.
on the Laws of England, Vol. II, p. 567) and again
among the ancient Goths we find a law providing for the
forfeiture of the sword or weapon employed in the killing of another, even though the actual owner of that
weapon were not concerned in the action. (Steirnhook
dr. Jure Goth 1. 3., c. 4.) (Stephen Com. on the Laws of
England, Vol. ii, p. 567)
Probably the doctrine belongs by right to an age when
the person who was morally responsible for the tort
caused by his own negligence was not liable in a private
action. The very basis of it is superstition, the implication being that the instrumentality was morally effected
from having caused the death. In truth, this was so far
the case that the forfeiture applied, even though the offending instrumentality belonged to the person killed,
and we have an early case reported where a man was
killed by his own cart, yet the cart was declared deodand
and its ptice given to his children, not necessarily because they were his children and his probable heirs, but
more likely because they were needy and it was therefor a pious use of the sum. (Glocestershire P1, 118)
In accordance with ancient ideas, the amount realized
from the deodand should have gone to the kinsmen of the
person slain, and probably originally it did, but the idea
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soon developed that the soul of him slain would not have
laid in peace until vengence was reaked upon the instrumentality, so it was sold and the proceeds of the sale
devoted to more pious uses which consisted in donation
to the Church and subsequently to the king for distribution as alms, and perhaps at one time to both. Stephen
has sensed this, "for it seems to have been originally designed in the blind days of popery as an expiation for
the souls of such which as were snatched away by sudden
death, and for that purpose ought properly have been
given to Holy Church." (Stephen-Laws of England.)
We have authority in the case of the stranger who was
found dead, whose apparel was taken from his body and
applied for the purchase of masses for the good of his
soul. (Staunf P C 20, 21) And for the theory that the
thing was damned as a result of its part in the killing in
that where it was already blest either actually or impliedly by its employment, the doctrine did not apply, as
a bell of a church which fell upon the head of the ringer.
(1 Sid. 207)
From the earliest records, we see that there was no
attempt made to distinguish between cases where the person killed was negligent, and between those cases were
he was not at fault, though the distinction does appear
in the later reports, especially in those cases decided
shortly before the abolition of the doctrine in 1846 (9 &
10 Vict. c 62), and "the large number of deodands collected in every eyre suggests that many horses and boats
bore the guilt that should have been ascribed to beer."
We find the case of the drunken carter driving his team
of oxen and cart loaded with a cask of wine, who so generously imbibed of the contents of his load as to become
sufficiently under the influence of it to fall beneath the
wheel of his cart which crushed and killed him. The
court held that not only the cart but also the cask of
wine that was in it, and the oxen that were driving it
were deodand and forfeited "to appease God's wrath."
(Northumberland Assize Rolls, p. 96)
Another distinction which grew in later years, though
originally was not contemplated by the doctrine, was the
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necessity of the moving of the object which caused the
death. Bracton was certainly one of the most early to
advance this limitation. We find that he (Br. 136 b) apparently thought it an abuse to condemn as deodand a
thing which had not moved. He distinguishes the horse
which throws a man and the horse off which a man
stupidly stumbles, the tree which falls upon a human and
the circumstance where a human is thrown fatally
against a tree, but in reviewing the cases of his time, it is
obvious that the distinction was not followed by the
courts at so early a period.
The theory developed that the absolute right to the
proceeds was vested in the king, to be extensively distributed by him or his high almoner as alms, or to be
devoted to public work, as the building of a bridge (the
price of a boat is devoted for "God's sake" to the repair of Tewkesburg Bridge, Glocestershire P1, 237). We
find deodands classed with other forfeitures accruing to
the crown as royal-fish, treasure-trove, waifes, mines,
and astrays, and as such might be granted as a royal
franchise by the sovereign to individual subjects (see
3 & 4 Will, c. 99, containing provision for the more
speedy recovery of fines, deodands, and so forth, by
the crown.) The result for the most part of this investment of the lords of the manor with the power was a
rather substantial perversion of the original design of
the doctrine and soon but a small proportion of the sums
realized were employed as alms or in pious uses.
WHEN DEODAND EXISTED

Perhaps it would be well before we discuss those things
which were deodand, to again define the doctrine in its
more modern sense, or as it later developed. A deodand
is any chattel animate or inanimate which moves to and
causes the death of a human being. It was forfeited to
the crown or the crown's representative, sold, and the
proceeds realized therefrom distributed as alms. We
find that the object originally did not necessarily need to
move at the time it caused the death, so long as it was
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movable, and that where the death was caused by misadventure, as falling upon the thing, it was deodand just
as though the thing itself had fallen upon the man.
(St. P1. C. 20) Further, if the object were moving, all
the things moving with it at the time it occasioned the
death were included with it in the forfeiture. (St. P1. C20b)
(Where a man riding upon a carriage falls from the
carriage, and the horses draw the carriage upon him by
which he dies, the horses and carriage are deodand, and
if the carriage were laden with hay, the hay is included
in the deodand. St. P1. C20) Further, we find that if a
man is thrown from the carriage in which he is riding by
its overturning, under the wheel of a wagon next to it,
and the wagon being loaden passes over him and kills
him, the carriage from which he was thrown, the horses
drawing it, the wagon which passed over him, the load,
and the horses drawing the wagon are all declared
deodand and forfeited. (R. 1 Sal. 220) So also, if the
objects were not essentially of a movable nature as where
one tree topples and falls against another and the latter
falls upon and causes the death of a human being, both
trees are deodand. (1 Sal. 220) The motion which is
the proximate cause of the accident need relate to but
one of the moving objects, for example, if the individual
is thrown from a carriage by the motion of but one
horse, though two or more are drawing the carriage, and
as a result of being so thrown, he dies, both of the horses
as well as the carriage are forfeited. (St. P1. C20a)
As we have seen, it made no difference, originally at
least and probably not in the later development of the
theory, whether or not the person killed were negligent
himself. Our test is, was the death accidental and the
result of a misadventure, remembering always that the
individual must die as a consequence, and that mere injury, no matter how severe, would not result in an invoking of the doctrine. We find also that the question
of ownership made no difference in whether or not the
forfeiture occurred. The instrumentality was confiscated
even though at the time of the accident it was in the
possession of and being manipulated by a person to whom
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it did not belong, as where the sword of B is used by A
and another is killed with it (by accident and not feloniously) the sword will be a deodand. (3 inst., 57 H 33)
However, in the Coroner's inquisition which finds and
"levies the deodand," the property must be alleged to be
belonging to the true owner and he must be named and
the property described. (Queen v. West, 1 A & E, 826)
The doctrine applied not only to objects upon land but
also to vessels and ships upon the water, so long as the
water were fresh and not salt. In Blackstone's Comm.
I, 302, we read: "If a man fall from a boat or ship in
fresh water and is drowned, it hath been said that the
vessel and cargo are, in strictness of law, a deodand."
Probably the reason for the distinction between fresh and
salt water is the inherent theory of the common law that
we find existent even today, and must have been of even
more influence in early time, that it should apply only to
Englishmen and not extend beyond the borders of the
country. (Nor a ship in the sea or salt water. St. P1.
C29a)
WHRFE No DEODAND EXISTED

The only practical way in which we can distinguish
between those cases where the instrumentality was forfeited and where it was not, is to turn to the cases themselves. Often they are almost impossible to reconcile
with those declaring a forfeiture, yet this is but natural
in a doctrine of as old and of as widespread a nature.
We find the obvious distinction made between a thing
which does not move and one which moves and thereby
causes death. The courts came to hold that'the former,
the thing that had moved was not deodand even tho
joined to the thing that had-as if a man falls from
the wheel of a carriage and is killed, but the carriage does not move, the wheel only is forfeited. (St.
P1. C. 20) And if a man falls into the water and is carried by the water under a mill and there pressed to death
by the wheel of the mill, only the wheel is forfeited. (St.
P1.,C. 20b) And if a person falls from a horse upon the
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trunk of a tree and breaks his head upon it by which he
dies, the horse only shall be forfeited. (St. P1. C. 20b)
From the same sources we find a case reported, perhaps
in conflict with those of the same nature, that if an individual is thrown by the motion of the horses from a cart
upon which he is sitting, and the cart is laden with litter,
only the cart and the horses are deodand, and not the
litter. The apparent conflict, however, may be explained
in that in this case the cart itself may not have been
moving. (St. P1. C. 20b) To the same effect we find reported a case where the person was thrown from his
horse into a river while fording a stream, by the violence
of the water. The horse is not a deodand, (R. 2 Cro. 483)
the motion of the water being the proximate cause of the
accident, and not the beast. (So also if he falls from a
horse when he plunges into the water. Semb. 2 Rol. 23.)
Generally if the object sought to be forfeited was a
part of, or in some way affixed to real property, the doctrine of deodand did not apply, "so a thing fixed to the
freehold shall not be a deodand as a door or gate of a
house forced by the wind against a man whereby he is
killed." (1 Sid. 307) Nor the sail of a windmill where
in turning it struck and caused the death of an individual
(1 Sid. 207), nor a millstone or wheel of a mill (R. Mod.
Ca. 187); nor a tree which is not severed but blown by
the wind against another (1 Sid. 207).
No deodand probably existed even originally where
the person who was killed as a result of the accident was
a child under fourteen, "so if a child within the age. of
discretion (viz., fourteen) falls upon a thing movable
and is killed it shall not be a deodand, or falls from a
cart, ship, horse, &c."
(3 inst., 57) Just why this distinction ever arose is hard to determine. The most
plausible theory perhaps is the superstitious or religious
nature of the doctrine itself. The article was sold
because it was damned and the proceeds employed, to appease God's wrath, in pious uses, so that the soul of the
individual slain might rest in peace and his sins be
atoned for. According to the religious and common law
theory, a child under the age of discretion, or under the
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age of fourteen, was incapable of sin, hence there was no
occasion for the forfeiture.
SoMEB LATER ENGLISH DECISIONS

The cases here reported all arise within seven years
previous to the abolition of the doctrine which occurred
in 1846. They are interesting in that they illustrate that
deodands was the law in England less than one hundred
years ago, and an important law. Th1ey show us that the
same degree of strictness and the same defenses apply
to them as to all pleadings requiring the utmost accuracy
or certainty, and they give an insight into the proper
procedure where a death of a human is caused by accident or misadventure as a result of a moving object.
The Queen v. Polwart, 1 A & E, 818:
In 1840 we find a Coroner's Inquest indicting one,
Joseph Polwart for manslaughter, finding that the instrument by which he perpetrated the deed to be a certain steamboat called the Manchester of Berwick, of
which he was master, and levying a deodand upon the
steamboat as a result of the killing of one Robert Mason,
placing a value upon the steamboat of 800F. The principal question raised was whether a Coroner's jury can
lay a deodand in any case where they find a verdict of
murder or manslaughter, and quoting from the opinion
of Lord Denman, we find that at least in 1840 and probably at no time could they.
"We are of the opinion that they cannot; and that the
latter part of the inquisition, which relates to the deodand, must be quashed.
"All the authorities in our law-books treat deodands
as being due where the death is by misadventure; and no
one instance has been adduced, or can be found, where a
deodand has been laid, where a verdict of murder or manslaughter has been found."
In the opinion he quotes from Lord Coke who in the
third Institute uses these words:
"Deodands -when any movable thing inanimate, or
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beast animate, do move to, or cause the untimely death
of any reasonable creature by mischance in any county
of the realm, (and not upon the sea, or upon any salt
water,) without the will, offence, or fault of himself, or
of any person."
Lord Denman then proceeds to point out that the basic
principles upon which the theory of deodand rests are
purely a matter of conjecture, and that in this present
day he hardly feels called upon to extend, but rather
feels he should limit their application only to those cases
"recognized by the law" and concludes his opinion:
"We have therefore no difficulty in' saying that this
finding of a deodand in a case of manslaughter, now for
the first time introduced, is bad, and that the inquisition,
so far as regards that finding, must be quashed."
The Queen v. William West, 1 A & E, 826:
The Coroner's Inquisition was upon three dead bodies.
It found that all had come to their deaths accidentally,
casually, and by misfortune, that a certain steam engine
and a certain railway carriage were moving to their respective deaths, "and are the goods and chattels of,
and in the possession of, the proprietors of the Hull and
Selby railway, and of the proprietors of the Leeds and
Selby railway, and are of the value of 500£ sterling."
The objection taken to the inquisition by council for
the railway company was to the effect that there was no
averment in the inquisition that the property attempted
to be forfeited was the property of a corporation or corporations, or that such corporations did in fact exist.
The inquisition was quashed, the court sustaining the objection of the defendants, Lord Denman saying in his
opinion:
"We ought to have some authority brought before us
to show that this finding is sufficient. The property must
be described. The deodand is to be levied on the
owners.")
The Queen v. Brownlow and Others, 11 A & E, 119:
The Coroner's Inquisition found that the person deceased on a day and place named, being on board a steam-
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boat then floating and being navigated in a river, "by
misfortune &c., a boiler containing water then and there
forming a part of the steam engine on board, the steamboat attached thereto, and that the boiler was then and
there used in working the steam engine for the purpose
of propelling the steamboat, and was then and there
heated by fire then and there forming a part of the steam
engine, burst, whereby boiling water and coals, &c., were
then and there used in working the steam engine, by misfortune, &c., were cast from the boiler and steam engine,
upon the deceased, whereby he then and there received a
shock, &c., and thereby became shaken, &c., of which
shock, &c., the deceased instantly died, &c.," and that the
boiler and steam engine were the cause of the death and
were moving thereto and are of the value of, &c.
The question raised was by an objection taken to the
inquisition in that it did not sufficiently state the day on
which the death had occurred, and the court sustained the
objection, quashed the inquisition, holding that the word
"instantly" was not a sufficient repeating of the time of
the explosion or of the death. There is nothing new, or
unique to the doctrine of deodands raised by the objection. The rule that a statement of time and place must
be repeated to every issuable and triable fact and that
the word "instantly" will not be equivalent to the words
"then and there "is the law in practically every common
law jurisdiction today unless expressly abbrogated by
statute.
The Queen v. Midland Railway Company, 8 Q. B., 587:
The Coroner's Inquisition found in the year 1844 in
the County of Nottingham that an individual by the name
of William Varnelrs, had been killed on a certain railway
car as a result of a collision with another train moving in
the opposite direction.
The inquisition then went on to ascribe the death to
injuries caused by the collision, found a verdict of accidental death, levied a deodand not only on both engines, but on all of the carriages, and found them to be
the property of the Midland Railway Company. The
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principle objection taken to the inquisition was that it
did not appear with sufficient certainty that the carriage
in which the deceased had been riding had collided or
come in contact with another carriage, tender, or locomotive engine, and further, that it was not alleged sufficiently that any of the other carriages, tender, or engines
had come into contact with, or generally moved to the
death of the deceased. The question raised was a technical one, arising solely from the insufficient wording of
the inquisition. Council for the Crown contended that
certain words could be rejected as surplusage, and if so
rejected, the inquisition might be read with sufficient
meaning, and that the cause of death would then be
properly stated. The court, however, quashed the inquisition holding technically that even with the rejection of
the words, the pleading would not be aided, stating:
"There are no words, in this inquisition, by rejecting
which that sentence can be made intelligible. It is a nominative case without a verb. The subject is described;
but nothing is predicated respecting it. We cannot supply by conjecture something more which the jury intended to find, but have not found."
PROCEDURE

Jurisdiction in levying a deodand seems to have rested
with the Coroner from the earliest inception of that office.
(And by inquisition before the Coroner, it must be
found, that it is deodand and the value. St. P1. C29a.)
It was his practice to return all inquisitions finding a
deodand as well as those "'felo de se" into the crown office
where they were filed. (R v. Stanlake, 1 Mod. Rep. 82)
It was held that the Coroner should return his examination with the inquisition, and that any person aggrieved
by such inquisition could then apply to the King's Bench
to refuse to allow it to be filed. This filing of the inquisition in the crown office was the preliminary step in declaring the forfeiture. The inquisition was then prosecuted by solicitors for the crown, corresponding perhaps
to our Attorney General today. Only a few years before
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the abolition of the doctrine we find a reported case illuminating in the extreme this question of procedure.
The Queen v. The Great Western Railway Company, 3 A
& E, N. S., 333:
The inquisition found that the deceased, one Richard
Woolley, was taken by the Coroner of the Borough of
Reading by a jury of the Borough of Reading in that
borough, and alleged that the death was caused accidentally by the deceased falling in the County of Berks
from a carriage, "then and there being in a certain carriage then and there attached to a certain engine then
and there drawing the same, it so happened that the said
Richard Woolley was then and there casually, accidentally, and by misfortune overturned and violently
thrown out of the said carriage to and against the
ground; by means whereof the said Richard Woolley did
then and there receive one mortal fracture in and upon
the hinder part of the head of him, the said Richard Woolley; of which said mortal fracture the said Richard Woolley from the said 24th day of December in the year aforesaid until the 29th day of December in the same year, at
the parish and county last aforesaid, and also at the
parish of St. Giles in the said borough of Reading, to wit,
in a certain hospital there, called the Royal Berkshire
Hospital, did languish, and languishing did live; on
which said 29th day of December, in the year aforesaid,
in the hospital aforesaid, at the parish last aforesaid,
in the borough aforesaid, the said Richard Woolley, of
the mortal fracture aforesaid, did die."
The inquisition continues with the finding upon oath by
the jurors that the deceased met his death accidentally,
casually, and by misfortune in the manner described,
and finds the value of the carriage and engine to be
100£, and to be the goods and chattels and in the possession of the Great Western Railway Company. The objection raised to the inquisition was that it appeared to
be taken before the Coroner of Reading, and yet upon
the face of the inquisition itself it is found that the accident occurred in the County of Berks, the defendant
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contending that the Coroner had no jurisdiction to lay a
deodand except in cases where the accident resulted and
the death occurred within the jurisdiction of the Coroner,
and also that the property to be seized was also situated
within it. After first declaring that the decision rested
upon the common law and not upon statutory enactment
the court sustained the objection and from the opinion
we are able to discover the precise proceeding of the Coroner in levying a deodand. We find first of all that the
mere fact of a body lying dead does not give the Coroner
jurisdiction. Nor even if the circumstance of the death
was sudden. That there must be a reasonable suspicion
that the deceased had met his death by some violent or
unnatural means. Further, that it is the initial duty of
the Coroner before he summons a jury to make some inquiry in order to ascertain just what the circumstances
were surrounding the death, and obviously where the
death occurred. If he finds that the death occurred beyond the jurisdiction and there is no ground for supposing that either the crime of murder or manslaughter has
been committed, he should abstain from summoning a
jury at all, and in order that an inquest be taken over the
body, it should be removed to the county where the circumstance occurred which was the cause of the death.
Quoting from the opinion of Lord Denman, Chief Justice:
"If the verdict be death by the visitation of God,
nothing more is done; for in truth it appears that there
was no occasion for an inquest. If the verdict be murder
or manslaughter, then the want of jurisdiction at common
law (if any) is cured by stat. 2'& 3 Ed. 6, c. 24. If the
verdict be "per infortunium," then the coroner (that is by
the jury) is 'to inquire of the deodand and the value and
in whose hands, and to seize and deliver the same to the
township to be answerable for the same to the King, by
the statute of 4 Ed. 1, De Officio Coronatoris;' 2 Hal. P1.
Cr. 62: but this supposes that the circumstances which
occasioned the death happened within his jurisdiction,
and that the deodand to be seized is also within it. If
the facts be otherwise, as in this case, then the finding of

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

the deodand at all events is merely void; but, as a want
of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the proceedings,
we are of opinion that the whole inquisition is void."
ENGLISH ABOLITION OF DEODANDS

That the people of England quite generally accepted
forfeituTes accruing to the crown under the law of deodands as a matter of course, we have ample evidence in
the mention made to them in the newspapers and periodicals of the time; for example, in the May issue, 1755,
of the "Gentleman's Magazine," we see the following
item:
"The inquisition which sat on the servant, of Mr.
Twinborow, who was gored by an ox, of which he died on
the 20th past, brought in their verdict, accidental death,
by an ox and found the ox a deodand, value of the purchase, the property of a butcher at Wapping."
And in the Mechanic's Magazine in 1838 an account of
a jury successfully levying a deodand of 1500f upon the
boiler or the steam engine of the Victoria. In an issue
of the same magazine of 1842 we find an article entitled,
"The Modern Mechanical Moloc" in which the author
severely censures the railroads for the numerous accidents that had occurred, attributing them to a general
lack of precaution and scarcity of safety measures, and
from it we quote:
"Deodand after deodand has been imposed by honest
and indignant juries-deodands surpassing in amount
any previously known to our criminal history."
Stephen in his Commentaries on the Law of England,
writing shortly before the abolition of the doctrine, illustrates the trend of public sentiment against it, saying:
"But juries have of late very frequently taken upon
themselves to mitigate these forfeitures by finding only
some trifling thing, or part of an entire thing to have
been the occasion of the death. And in such case, although the finding by the jury be hardly warrantable by
law, the court of Queen's Bench hath generally refused
to interfere on behalf of the 'lord of the franchise to
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assist so unequitable a claim.' (Foster 266, 267, Thus
if A, sitting on his wagon, falls, the horses draw on the
wagon, the fore-wheel crushes his head, and he dies, and
the Coroner's jury find the wheel only is the deodand,
the court will not quash the inquisition. iNo man can
prescribe to it, it must be by the King's grant) Yet it is
obvious that it would be better that a law should be
abolished so repugnant to the feelings of mankind, than
that the solemn oath under which a juror gives his verdict should be thus evaded."
The doctrines of deodands was finally abolished in
England in 1846 by Statutes 9 & 10 Vict. c62"there shall be no forfeiture of any chattel for or in
respect of the same having moved to or caused the death
of man; and no Coroner's jury sworn to inquiry, upon
the site of any dead body, how the deceased came by his
death, shall find any forfeiture of any chattel which may
have moved to or caused the death of the deceased, or
any deodand whatsoever. And it shall not be necessary
in any inquisition for homicide to allege the value of the
instrument which caused the death of the deceased or to
allege that the same was of no value."
DEODANDS

IN

THE UNITED STATES

The enactments of the State of Illinois make the common law of England as it existed prior to the fourth year
of James I, the law of this state, unless expressly
changed or abrogated by statute. (Chap. 28 Ill. Statutes.)
We have never expressly abolished or abrogated the doctrine of deodands, and improbable as it may be, it
is not impossible to conceive of its application at the present time. It is true we have no king, but we do have
a sovereignty in the people themselves. Our Attorney
General or States Attorney is the legal representative of,
at least indirectly, that sovereignty. We have a Coroner
and an inquest, and perhaps some Coroner's jury today
might find death to have been caused by accident and
misadventure, that a certain beast or chattel moved to
and caused the death, that its value was so many dollars
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and levy a deodand upon the beast or chattel, sign and
seal the inquisition under oath, the signatures and seals
of the Coroner and of the requisite number of jurors being attached thereto and file the inquisition in the Criminal Court. In proceeding upon it, the prosecuting officer
would not only encounter no express abolishing statute,
but also no case decided within this jurisdiction. Were
the action successful, the proceeds of the sale, providing
the article were not redeemed by the owner, could just
as readily be applied today in public work as originally
in alms or pious uses. There is ample authority for such
a disposition.
Deodands have been commented upon a number of
times by courts of the various states of this country as
well as by the Supreme Court of the United States. In
the latter it was mere historical dicta, describing it as
somewhat analogous to the federal action in rem against
an automobile containing liquor under the revenue act,
and justifying by way of ancient precedent the general
theory of forfeiture. So also the case of Daniels v.
Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 51 S. E., 992, involving the forfeiture of nets upon illegal fishing. The only case in this
country where the doctrine was raised seriously is the
case of Parker-HarrisCompany v. Tate, 135 Tenn., 509;

188 S. W., 54. The facts were substantially as follows:
The plaintiff was an automobile dealer in Memphis, who
sold an automobile to one, Richardson, and accepted in
payment a cash deposit, the balance in notes to be paid
from time to time, with the title remaining in the plaintiff, the vendor, until final payment. Shortly after the
sale, while driving the car, the purchaser ran over and
killed a small negro boy. The administrator of the deceased brought suit against Richardson, the purchaser,
to recover damages for the death. An attachment was
issued and the car levied upon under a statute of Tennessee, granting a lien upon the automobile in case of an
accident. This is an action of replevin brought by the
vendor against the sheriff who had levied the writ of attachment, claiming right of possession by reason of the
title retained in the sale. Council for the administrator
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contended that the vendor's lien should have priority,
basing his argument upon the theory of the law of
deodands. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the defendant, holding deodands still to be the law in that state
and that the statute of Tennessee which grants an injured person a lien upon an automobile was based upon it,
and in consequence the statute should have preference
and priority, quoting:
"We can best answer this question by tracing the history and development of the idea of responsibility for
injuries done by dangerous or quasi-dangerous instrumentalities. This is known as the doctrine of deodand,
Practical lawyers may scorn this method of treating of
intricate questions if they want to. We are persuaded
that this is the only broad, logical, and jurisprudential
way of solving provisions that are now in the realm of
debate. Analogy is still the great light, and history is a
luminary of almost equal force. And it must not be forgotten that numberless rules of the ancient common law
are operative today, and that juridicial concepts are so
persistent as to come to life and illuminating questions
arising in ages far distant from their origin."
This decision of the Court of Civil Appeals was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State by the plaintiff
below, the vendor, and resulted in a reversal of the Court
of Civil Appeals. Judge Williams of the Tennessee Supreme Court, the author of the opinion, holds that the
doctrine of deodands should be entirely discarded, and
announces it as repugnant to all of our American ideas
of justice. He said in part:
"To the credit of American jurisprudence, from the
outset the doctrine was deemed to be so repugnant to our
ideas of justice as not to be included as a part of the
common law of this country."
The opinion of the Supreme Court in holding that
the statute was not based upon deodands is undoubtedly
correct. The statute provides not for a forfeiture, but
only for a lien for damages which were not to be measured by the value of the machine but by the extent of the
injury. It is readily apparent to those familiar with the
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law of deodands that it .loes not apply. Mere injury was
sufficient under the statute, death was not made essential.
Also, the statute provides that the instrumentality be of
a dangerous or quasi-dangerous sort, whereas a deodand
may be any instrumentality so long as it move to and
cause the accidental death of the person injured. We
may also note that no cases are cited for the statement to
the effect that deodands are not included in the common
law of this country. It would seem there should be some
justification for so summary a disposition of as well
founded a principle. We also find that the opinion is well
forfeited by Article 1, par. 12 of the Constitution of 1870
of Tennessee:
"No corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates; no
deodands. That no conviction shall work corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate. The estate of such persons
as shall destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as
in case of natural death. If any person be killed by casualty there shall be no forfeiture in consequence thereof."
No such provision exists in the Constitution or Statute
law of the State of Illinois, and the preceding case should
hardly serve to deter any one who is interested in and
has the means to attempt an application of the doctrine.
Whether successful or not, it would be interesting to
know the reaction of our own Supreme Court upon a
common law principle so ancient and apparently forgotten.

